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Abstract. This paper develops a model of child custody based
on an incomplete-contract approach to the allocation of property
rights. Because of the presence of transaction costs in marriage,
altruistic parents cannot contract upon the investments they make
into their children, but can reduce the resulting ineﬃciencies by
determining ex ante the parent who would be allocated custody
in case they divorce. We show that: (i) the optimal allocation of
custodial rights depends on both preferences and technological fac-
tors; (ii) custodial rights can be allocated either to the parent who
values the beneﬁts from child welfare more or, viceversa, to the
parent with the lowest valuation; (iii) if one parent’s investment is
signiﬁcantly more important than the other parent’s investment,
then sole custody is preferred to joint custody and it should be allo-
cated to the parent whose investment is relatively more important;
and (iv) if the importance of the parents’ investments is suﬃciently
similar and if the diﬀerences in parents’ valuations of child quality
are large, then joint custody is optimal with the low-valuation par-
ent receiving a relatively greater share, because the other parent
would invest in the child anyway while the low-valuation parent
would be endowed with greater bargaining power. The implica-
tions of these results are then interpreted in the context of current
custody laws, discussed in relation to empirical estimates of some
of the parameters underlying the optimal custody rule, and used
to question the skepticism surrounding prenuptial contracts.
“When by birth a child is subject to a father, it is for the
general interest of families, and for the general interest of
children, and really for the interest of the particular infant,
that the Court should not, except in very extreme cases,
interfere with the discretion of the father.” Re Agar-Ellis
(1883) [cited in Maidment (1984, p. 98)].
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“Since wives will, under most circumstances, be awarded
custody regardless of the statutory standard, and since it
seems wise to discourage traumatic custody contests when-
ever it is possible to do so, the [Uniform Marriage and Di-
vorce] act should discourage those few husbands who might
wish to contest by establishing a presumption that the wife
is entitled custody. ... [I]t may well be true that because
of the presumption some fathers who would be better cus-
todians than their wives will either fail to seek custody or
will be denied custody following a contest, but that disad-
vantage has a lower ‘social cost’ than the disadvantages of
any alternative statutory formulation.” Ellsworth and Levy
(1969, p. 203)
1. Introduction
The custody of children after their parents separate or divorce is
a complex issue. It is a matter of concern not only for the parties
directly involved (i.e., mothers, fathers, and children) but also for soci-
ety at large.
1 Although newspapers describe the bitter and protracted
divorces of the rich and famous, and television and cinema dramatize
courtroom battling, conﬂict over the terms of divorce — that involves
such issues as child custody, visitation rights and child support — is
very common (Sarat and Felstiner 1989).
2 With more than 50 percent
of children in the United States and 40 percent in Britain expected to
live apart from at least one of their parents before reaching adulthood
(Bumpass, Raley, and Sweet 1995; Ermisch and Francesconi 2000), and
with many of these children facing an array of adverse consequences
(McLanahan and Sandefur 1994; Haveman and Wolfe 1995), child cus-
tody is clearly a key issue for a variety of agents, including policy
makers, social workers, lawyers, and social analysts.
1In many countries, there has recently been an increasing emphasis on the im-
portance of public investments in services for children in general, and for children
of divorced and lone parents in particular. Examples are the Earned Income Tax
Credit, Head Start, and the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families in the United
States, and the Child Tax Credit, the Working Tax Credit, and the New Deal for
Lone Parents in Britain.
2Using data on a sample of about 1100 California families who ﬁled for divorce
between September 1984 and April 1985, Maccoby and Mnookin (1997) ﬁnd that
approximately 50 percent of these families had some form of custody conﬂict. How-
ever, only 1 in 4 of the families in this sample report high-conﬂict resolutions, with
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The problem of which parent should have custody is, in practice,
discussed and resolved only when the parents have already separated
or when they are in the process of getting divorced. That is, custody
is determined ex post (Maccoby 1999). In line with this practice, most
of the policy interest has often centered on the question of what can
be done to help divorcing parents resolve the custody issue eﬀectively
(Garﬁnkel et al. 1998). Child custody could, alternatively, be discussed
and determined ex ante, while the parents are married, and well before
divorce becomes an issue. It may be argued that discussing the terms
of divorce at the outset of marriage is unnecessary or even counterpro-
ductive to the success of the marriage itself. This argument may partly
explain why binding and legally enforceable prenuptial contracts are ei-
ther not in use in a number of countries, such as Britain (Leech 2000),
or largely under-regulated in others — including the United States,
Canada, and Australia — where, in any case, custody rights are not
covered by prenuptial agreements (Nasheri 1998; Fehlberg and Smyth
2002).
A fundamental notion that underlies this paper is that, given the
presence of “transaction costs” (such as the costs of coordinating and
enforcing an agreement about partners’ interdependent actions), it is
optimal to determine the terms of divorce at the outset of marriage.
Optimality here is deﬁned in terms of maximizing children’s welfare
and marital surplus, which in turn would help minimize the likelihood
of divorce.
3 The terms of divorce — that among other things stipu-
late which of the two parents would have custody — determine the
parents’ respective outside options. These inﬂuence the parents’ bar-
gaining powers over bargaining situations that they encounter during
their marriage, and hence inﬂuence the distribution of the marital sur-
plus. This, in turn, aﬀects each partner’s incentives to contribute to the
generation of the surplus in the ﬁrst place. Hence, the terms of divorce
have also eﬃciency consequences. The levels of various relationship-
speciﬁc investments (such as investments in children’s human capital)
made by the parents are key determinants of both children’s welfare
and marital surplus. If such investments can be contracted upon, then
— as would be implied by an application of the Coase theorem (Coase
1960) — eﬃcient levels of such investments would be implementable,
irrespective of when the terms of divorce are determined and irrespec-
tive of what those terms are. In such a frictionless world, the terms
of divorce would have no eﬃciency consequences; they would however
3As explained later, this optimality criterion is also consistent with the prevailing
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continue to aﬀect the distribution of the eﬃcient level of the surplus.
But, when the investments cannot be contracted upon — due to the
presence of transaction costs — the terms of divorce will also matter
for eﬃciency (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990).
In this paper, we are concerned with intact families that are com-
prised of married or cohabiting partners,
4 who either already have or
are planning to have children. We are not concerned with the situ-
ation faced by divorcing couples or by individuals who already went
through a marital dissolution. By looking at intact families, the entire
course of actions of the parents during marriage (e.g., their marriage-
speciﬁc investments) is aﬀected. The equilibrium terms of divorce are
then those that induce the best optimizing actions from parents. Given
that it is optimal to establish child custody ex ante, the key issue is to
determine the parent who should optimally be allocated sole custody
or the shares of joint custody that each parent would receive upon di-
vorce. To analyze this issue we develop a simple three-stage model.
In the ﬁrst stage, the two partners negotiate and determine the terms
of divorce and stipulate them in a contract that allocates custodial
rights in the eventuality of divorce.
5 In the second stage, the partners
independently and non-cooperatively choose their respective levels of
investments in their children.
6 Finally, in the third stage, they negoti-
ate over the partition of the resultant marital surplus in the shadow of
divorce. The optimal custody rule is underpinned by two sets of key
parameters. The ﬁrst is given by parents’ child-preference parameters,
which capture the degrees of altruism of each parent towards their chil-
dren in each of the three possible regimes (or marital states), that is:
(i) the parents remain married, (ii) the parents divorce and the father
is allocated custody, and (iii) the parents divorce and the mother is
4Throughout the paper, the terms “marriage” and “cohabitation” are synony-
mous. Similarly, the terms “husband/wife” and “partner” are used interchange-
ably. It is worth noticing, however, that in a number of countries (including the
United States and Britain) children are by default allocated to their mother after
the break-up of a cohabiting union and, thus, child custody per se is not an issue
legally. But in this paper we are concerned with the behavioral implications of a
rule that is likely to aﬀect the economic decisions of both partners in any durable
union. In this respect, the legal distinctions between marriage and cohabitation are
inconsequential.
5Although other aspects of the post-divorce relationship (e.g., child-rearing, child
and spousal support, and visitation rights) are relevant to the determination of the
terms of divorce, they are not considered here for simplicity.
6The non-cooperative nature of such investments is related to the fact that they
are not contractable and thus cannot be veriﬁed by third parties (such as the court
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allocated custody (these regimes will be operative also in the case of
joint custody). The second set is represented by technological param-
eters that capture the productivities (or importance) of each parent’s
investment in their children in each of the three marital states.
Our analysis shows several interesting results. Here we draw atten-
tion to four. First, the optimal allocation of custodial rights depends
on both parental preferences and technology structure, regardless of
whether joint custody is ruled out or not. Even though there are sit-
uations in which the fact that a parent is the key investor and other
aspects of the technology do not matter, both comparative degrees of
parental altruism and comparative parental productivities in generat-
ing child quality are relevant to the determination of custodial rights.
Second, sole custodial rights or greater shares of joint custody can be
allocated either to the parent who values the beneﬁts from child qual-
ity more or, viceversa, to the parent with the lowest valuation. The
actual allocation must take account of who the key investor is and
the productivity of each parent’s investment. A fundamental principle
that governs the allocation of custodial rights is the “balancing out” of
parents’ bargaining power and investment incentives. In this perspec-
tive, giving a share of joint custody (or perhaps even sole custody) to
the parent with the lowest valuation is consistent with the aim of en-
dowing this parent with a greater bargaining power and thus inducing
him/her to provide the optimal level of child investment. Third, if one
parent’s investment is signiﬁcantly more important than the other par-
ent’s investment, then sole custody is preferred to joint custody, and it
should be allocated to the parent whose investment is relatively more
important. In these circumstances, parents’ preferences are irrelevant.
Fourth, joint custody is optimal when the productivities of parents’ in-
vestments are suﬃciently similar and the diﬀerences in their valuations
of child quality are suﬃciently large. In these cases, a greater share of
joint custody should go to the parent with the lowest valuation pre-
cisely because the parent with the highest valuation would invest in
the child anyway, and the low-valuation parent would be endowed with
greater bargaining power.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses
the related literature. Section 3 lays down a simple model that char-
acterizes the equilibrium implications of alternative allocations of sole
custodial rights. Section 4 analyzes the optimal custody decision and
derives our main results on sole custody. Section 5 extends the model
to the analysis of joint custody. Section 6 discusses the implications of
our main results in the context of current custody laws and links them
to the empirical knowledge of the key parameters in our model. Section6 MARCO FRANCESCONI AND ABHINAY MUTHOO
7 concludes. For ease of exposition all technical proofs are relegated to
the Appendix.
2. Related Literature
Ever since the contributions of Becker (1974, 1981/1991), economists
have developed a wide range of family behavior models in which part-
ners are assumed to have either common preferences or separate pref-
erences (for comprehensive surveys, see Bergstrom [1997], Behrman
[1997], Weiss [1997] and Ermisch [2003]). Within the non-unitary mod-
els, an increasing number of studies explore the implications of a cou-
ple’s inability to make binding legally-enforceable commitments about
future behavior, inability that typically leads to ineﬃcient allocations
of household resources (Mazzocco 2001; Basu 2001; Lich-Tyler 2001;
Lundberg and Pollak 2001). This strand of research on the family
has been preceded by another large and rich theoretical literature on
incomplete contracts and hold-up problems, which has shed light on
many issues ranging from vertical and lateral integration to ownership
rights and delegation of power within ﬁrms (Grossman and Hart 1986;
Hart and Moore 1990; Hart 1995). Rarely have these two classes of re-
search (i.e., family interactions and incomplete contracts) been joined.
7
The aim of our paper is to bridge this gap by exploiting the insights
of the incomplete-contract literature to improve our understanding of
the allocation of custodial rights upon divorce.
The incomplete contracting approach emphasizes the presence of
transaction costs, which could be relevant to many household deci-
sions. Examples of such costs are the costs of coordinating an agree-
ment about partners’ interdependent actions, the costs of monitoring
and enforcing such an agreement, and the costs of renegotiation (Pollak
1985; Lundberg and Pollak 2001).
8 The presence of these costs implies
that an eﬃcient allocation of resources cannot be guaranteed, even in
a world of complete information (Muthoo 1999). Although our model
is embedded in an incomplete contracting framework, its key features
are shared by most of the economic analyses of the family, namely: (i)
parents’ altruism towards their children (Becker 1981; Ermisch 2003);
(ii) the assumption that the distribution of the marital surplus is de-
termined by negotiations between couples (McElroy and Horney 1981;
7An example of application that combines elements of the incomplete-contract
approach with some aspects of the economic theory of the family is in Rasul (2002).
Rainer (2003) also applies this approach to explore the optimal allocation of house-
hold property rights upon divorce.
8For a clear and critical exposition of the hypotheses underlying such costs within
the broader realm of the incomplete-contract literature, see Tirole (1999).AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF CHILD CUSTODY 7
Chiappori 1988); and (iii) parents’ investments in their children (Becker
and Tomes 1986; Mulligan 1997).
What we currently know on child custody issues comes primarily
from legal studies. These either investigate the implications of the le-
gal norms behind customary custody rules, such as the rule based on
the “best interest of the child” (Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit 1979; Ma-
son 1994), or describe the implementation of such rules and how they
aﬀect the parties involved (Kurki-Suonio 2000). From this literature we
build, in particular, on the work by Mnookin and Kornhauser (1979).
Their study argues that the primary role of divorce law is to provide
the framework within which divorcing parents are allowed to reach an
agreement over, among other things, the allocation of custodial rights
through private negotiations (in the shadow of the law). Our model
takes this notion of private ordering one step further, by considering
custody negotiations between partners well before divorce becomes an
issue.
Economists, in contrast, have largely neglected the study of child
custody.
9 One exception is given by the study of Weiss and Willis
(1985). Both our and their models consider an intact family, in which
the allocation of child custodial rights upon divorce are determined up-
front, that is, when the parents (and children) are still living together.
In our model, however, the allocation of custodial rights have eﬃciency
consequences within marriage, and the optimal rule is the one which in-
duces the smallest amount of ineﬃciency. This is because our model is
based on an incomplete-contract framework. Conversely, in the Weiss-
Willis model, custodial rights have no eﬃciency consequences because
partners are assumed to be able to write complete contracts on in-
trahousehold allocations of resources.
10 Another point of departure is
that parents’ investments in the child during marriage and negotiations
9In most of the existing empirical studies, this neglect is partly justiﬁed by the
fact that maternal legal and physical custody is still the predominant arrange-
ment among divorcing couples (see, among others, Del Boca and Flinn [1995] and
Garﬁnkel et al. [1998]). Joint (or shared) custody, however, has increasingly be-
come more common. For example, in Britain and the United States, at the end of
the twentieth century, joint custody accounts for about one-quarter of post-divorce
living arrangements for children. Less than 10 percent of cases are awarded to the
father, while the remaining two-thirds are still awarded to the mother. At the be-
ginning of the 1970s, joint custody was virtually inexistent, with at least 90 percent
of cases awarded to the mother.
10In their model custodial rights matter, in the sense that they have eﬃciency
consequences, but only after the partnership breaks down. Furthermore, divorce
occurs with a probability that depends on the selected eﬃcient intrahousehold al-
location. Hence, the optimal custodial rule is the one which is eﬃcient overall,8 MARCO FRANCESCONI AND ABHINAY MUTHOO
over the marital surplus in the shadow of divorce play a key role in our
analysis. But they do not in the Weiss-Willis model, which instead
focuses on the set of Pareto-eﬃcient allocations within marriage, and
on the sets of privately optimal (but ineﬃcient) allocations in the case
of divorce.
Another exception is the paper by Rasul (2003), who has indepen-
dently developed a model of child custody that shares some of the basic
ideas of this paper. There are, however, three important diﬀerences be-
tween this paper and Rasul’s. First, in this paper, we emphasize that
parental altruism may vary depending on whether a parent is (or is not)
allocated custody to. Such a link will turn out to be of primary impor-
tance for some of our results. Second, this paper explores in greater
detail the eﬀect of parental technology in producing child quality on
the optimal custody rule. Parents’ diﬀerential abilities in producing
child quality will be another critical determinant of our optimal rule.
While Rasul (2003) ﬁnds that the parent who values the beneﬁts from
child quality more should be allocated either sole custody or a higher
share of joint custody (thus extending the results of Besley and Ghatak
[2001] to the analysis of child custody), our model oﬀers a more com-
plex set of results. In our world, in fact, sole custody or greater shares
of joint custody can be allocated either to the high-valuation parent
or to the low-valuation parent depending on who the key investor is,
as well as on the speciﬁc structure of the technology parents use to
produce child quality. A third diﬀerence is that we specify a model
in which divorce cannot occur in equilibrium. Rasul (2003) instead, in
line with Weiss and Willis (1985), proposes a model in which divorce
occurs with positive probability and is endogenous to the parents’ in-
vestment decisions.
11 Given these diﬀerences and the diﬀerent results
that these two papers deliver, we view them as complementary to each
other. Combining their insights in a uniﬁed framework would surely
enhance our understanding of the allocation of custodial rights and is
left for future research.
12
internalizing the fact that divorce occurs with nonzero probability and an ineﬃ-
cient allocation is instead implemented.
11The possibility of divorce however comes at the cost of introducing a number
of hard-to-test assumptions on the distribution of the gains from marriage and its
properties (see, for instance, Assumptions A2-A5 in Rasul [2003]).
12Brown and Flinn (2002) present a model of the relationship between parental
investment decisions under a given divorce policy regime and outcomes realized
by children. In their paper, divorce occurs endogenously (as in the Weiss-Willis
and Rasul’s models) and, as in our paper, parental investments can be speciﬁed ex
ante. In contrast to our model, however, parents can only choose investments andAN ECONOMIC MODEL OF CHILD CUSTODY 9
As we mentioned above, our study draws from the large literature
on incomplete contracting, which has typically examined the optimal
allocation of property rights for physical assets that are private goods
(see the comprehensive survey in Hart [1995]).
13 The analysis in Besley
and Ghatak (2001), however, has extended that literature to the case of
physical public goods (e.g., social services, investment projects, agricul-
tural extensions, and microlending in developing countries). They show
that if contracts are incomplete the ownership of such goods should lie
with the party that values the beneﬁt generated by them relatively
more. This is true regardless of whether this party is the key investor
and regardless of technological (dis)advantages that may characterise
this agent. In their model, however, it is implicitly assumed that the
value attached to the asset by each party is independent of who actu-
ally owns the asset. When interpreted in the context of the allocation
of child custodial rights, this means that each parent’s degree of al-
truism is the same regardless of which parent is allocated custody to.
In contrast, we will explicitly allow for the possibility that the degree
of parental altruism depends on which parent gets custody. Indeed,
it may be the case that the custodial parent places a higher value on
the child than the noncustodial parent does, because, for example, the
latter suﬀers a loss of control over the allocative decisions of the former
(Weiss and Willis 1985).
3. The Model
Consider a family that is comprised of a mother m,af a t h e rf and
a child.14 Our model is a three-stage game between m and f.I n
the background, besides the child, there is also another passive player,
not custody, even though custody arrangements can be endogenous to the parental
investments themselves within marriage or to the choice of divorce.
13Exactly because of the private nature of the goods involved, the main results of
this literature cannot be directly applied to the allocation of child custodial rights.
The reason is that, if parents split up, the noncustodial parent would obtain no
utility from the child after divorce. This is in contrast with the basic notion that
children are public or collective consumption goods from the point of view of the
mother and the father (Becker 1974), and continue to be seen as such even after
divorce by both parents, despite the loss of proximity and contact faced by the
noncustodial parent (Becker, Landes, and Michael 1977; Weiss and Willis 1985 and
1993).
14For simplicity and without loss of generality, the discussion will be carried out
as though the couple produces only one child. Since splitting siblings after divorce
has been resisted by courts in most countries, on the grounds that it entails further
erosion of the original family unit (Heatherington 1993), the one-child assumption
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namely the legal institutions (e.g., courts), which are assumed to have
the powers to enforce the terms of any (incomplete) contract that the
couple might have voluntarily negotiated and agreed upon.
In this section and the next we illustrate the case in which only sole
custody allocations (whereby one or the other parent is allocated legal
and physical custody to) are possible.15 We do this for two reasons.
First, excluding joint custody makes the modeling easier and sharp-
ens our insights into the economic forces driving custody allocation
decisions. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the results that we
obtain in a world in which there is only sole custody are interesting
in their own right, and are likely to be of general interest within the
latest developments of both the incomplete contracting literature and
the economic literature on family decisions in the presence of transac-
tion costs (Besley and Ghatak 2001; Lundberg and Pollak 2001; Rasul
2003). In section 5 we will extend this model by including the possibil-
ity of joint custody, and thus explore the circumstances under which
joint custody gives rise to higher equilibrium marital surplus (and child
welfare) than either of the two sole custodial allocations.
3.1. Preferences and Technology. The child utility (or welfare) de-
pends on the levels of investments If and Im made respectively by the
father and mother, and on whether or not the parents remain mar-
ried.16 Speciﬁcally, the child utility is W(If,I m) if the parents remain
married, and w(If,I m;i) if they divorce and i (i = f,m) is allocated
custody. The three functions W(.), w(.;f)a n dw(.;m) (as functions
of If and Im) are strictly concave, strictly increasing and satisfy the
Inada endpoint conditions. Given the overwhelming stock of evidence
according to which children fare better oﬀ when their parents remain
married than when they divorce (McLanahan and Sandefur 1994; Have-
man and Wolfe 1995), we assume that both the child’s total utility and
his/her marginal utility of each parent’s investment is higher in the
former regime. That is:
15Although the law distinguishes between physical and legal custody, our treat-
ment of custody here combines the two concepts.
16Such investments (in child quality or human capital) may involve parental
time, eﬀort and ﬁnancial inputs. For the purposes of this paper such distinctions
are generally unimportant, although in the interpretation of the results derived
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Assumption 1. For each i = f,m and for any If ≥ 0 and Im ≥ 0,
W(If,I m) >w (If,I m;i) and Wj(If,I m) >w j(If,I m;i) (where j =
f,m).17
If parents remain married, the payoﬀ to i is µiW(If,I m), where µi >
0 is a parameter that represents the degree of altruism (or value) that
i attaches to child welfare in the regime where the child is brought up
in an intact household. However, if they divorce and i has custody,
then the payoﬀ to j is λj(i)w(If,I m;i), where λj(i) > 0 is a parameter
that represents the degree of altruism that j attaches to child welfare
in the regime where a separation has occurred and i has custody. We
therefore allow for the possibility that a parent’s degree of altruism
towards the child varies across the three possible marital states.
Marriage may be seen in part as a relationship of trust and proxim-
ity (Becker 1991; Dasgupta 1988), while in the divorce state, there is
no available mechanism which will induce the custodial parent to in-
ternalise the eﬀects of his/her actions on the absent parent (Weiss and
Willis 1985). This reasoning underpins the assumption that parents’
degree of altruism is higher in the regime when they are married, that
is:
Assumption 2. µi >λ i(j) for all i,j = f,m.
Besides the child-preference parameters denoted by µf, µm, λf(f),
λm(f), λf(m)a n dλm(m), the other core parameters of the model are
embedded in the technology that parents use to invest in their child.
These are captured by the productivities of the parental investments
and are given by the properties of the functions W(.), w(.;f)a n d
w(.;m), as functions of the parents’ investments. Our main objective
is to analyze the impact of these parameters on the optimal custody
rule. To do so parsimoniously, in what follows we abstract from other
elements that may be relevant and play a part in custody decisions,
e.g. private consumption and parental income.18
3.2. The Strategic Environment. At date 0, parents are married
and agree upon a contract that determines the parent who is to have
17The terms Wj and wj respectively denote the ﬁrst-order derivatives of W and
w with respect to Ij.
18The model developed by Weiss and Willis (1985) does consider parents’ in-
comes, but these are taken as exogenous to the key parental choices, namely per-
sonal consumption and child expenditures. A fully strategic representation of family
interactions would require married partners to choose their optimal labour supplies
(Chiappori 1992), which in turn leads to endogenous parents’ incomes. This exten-
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custody if they divorce (at date 2). The contract is costlessly enforce-
able by the court. At date 1, the father and the mother (who continue
to be married) simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose the levels
of investments on their child, If and Im, respectively.19 Such invest-
ments are sunk at this date. The cost to i (i = f,m)o fi n v e s t i n gIi
equals kiIi,w h e r eki > 0 denotes i’s constant marginal cost of invest-
ment.
For any arbitrary set of choices made at dates 0 and 1, it follows
from Assumptions 1 and 2, that
(µf + µm)W(If,I m) > [λf(i)+λm(i)]w(If,I m;i).
The left-hand side of this inequality is the size of the marital surplus
that the couple can generate by remaining married, while the right-
hand side is the sum of their divorce payoﬀs if at date 0 it is decided that
i will have custody upon divorce. Although it is eﬃcient for the mother
and father to remain married, they will need to reach an agreement
over the partition of this marital surplus before they are in a position
to generate and consume it. Thus, at date 2 the couple engages in
bilateral negotiations. If agreement is reached with the father making
a transfer T to the mother, then the utility payoﬀs to the father and
the mother are respectively:20
Vf = µfW(If,I m) − T
Vm = µmW(If,I m)+T.
It should be noticed that, although (given Assumptions 1 and 2) ef-
ﬁcient bargaining implies that in equilibrium the parents will remain
married, the size of the marital surplus depends on the equilibrium in-
vestments made at date 1. The latter, it will be shown below, depend on
the equilibrium distribution of the surplus between the couple, which,
in turn, depends on the parents’ relative bargaining powers that are in
general inﬂuenced by their respective divorce payoﬀs. To describe the
outcome of the negotiations at date 2, we adopt the Nash Bargaining
Solution (NBS), in which the threat point is given by divorce.21 We
19Since these investments are “non-contractable” — because, for example, they
can be veriﬁed neither by the court nor by the other partner — this necessarily
implies that they will be choosen “non-cooperatively”.
20If T is positive the transfer is from the father to the mother, but if T is negative
then the opposite is true.
21Muthoo (1999) discusses the strategic non-cooperative foundations of the NBS,
and, using a number of versions of Rubinstein’s alternating-oﬀers model, shows
when and how to use this bargaining solution concept. In the context of marital
bargaining situations, there are circumstances under which the divorce payoﬀs (i.e.,
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assume that the above three-stage game is one with complete infor-
mation. In particular, the values of all the parameters (such as each
parent’s degrees of altruism in the three regimes) are common knowl-
edge between the two partners.
3.3. Equilibrium Bargaining Outcome. Before addressing the ques-
tion as to which of the two parents should be allocated custody at date
0, we need to derive the equilibrium implications of each of the two
custody arrangements (i.e., paternal custody and maternal custody).
At date 0, the two partners agree that if they divorce at date 2 cus-
tody will be allocated to i,w h e r ei = f or i = m.A t d a t e 1 t h e
mother’s investment choice is Im (where Im ≥ 0) and the father’s in-
vestment choice is If (where If ≥ 0). With the NBS, the utility payoﬀs
to the parents can be described by the split-the-diﬀerence principle:22
each parent’s Nash-bargained utility payoﬀ equals her/his divorce pay-
oﬀ plus one-half of the marital surplus. Hence, after simplifying and
rearranging terms, it follows that the Nash-bargained utility payoﬀs to
















(µf + µm)W(If,I m)+[ λm(i) − λf(i)]w(If,I m;i)

. (2)
Notice that if λm(i)=λf(i) then the parents’ payoﬀs are identical,
i.e., they split equally the marital surplus. However, if the parents’
degrees of altruism towards the child diﬀer (in the hypothesized regime
that custody upon divorce would be allocated to i), then the parent
as we assume in this paper; for example, when the risk of divorce occurring is
suﬃciently large. In other circumstances — when such a risk is suﬃciently small —
the divorce payoﬀs should not be identiﬁed with the threat point, but instead aﬀect
the bargaining outcome in the manner described by the so-called outside option
principle (see Muthoo [1999, chapter 5]). It may be noted that in such cirumstances
the threat point would be more convincingly identiﬁed with the payoﬀs obtained
from non-cooperation within marriage, along the lines modelled in Lundberg and
Pollak (1993). This is another interesting extension which we leave for future
analysis.
22We adopt the symmetric NBS which leads the parties to split equally the
net marital surplus. This, however, does not imply that husband and wife will
have equal bargaining powers because such powers depend crucially also on their
respective divorce payoﬀs. Adopting an asymmetric NBS would provide us with
an additional parameter that captures sources of bargaining power that are not
already embodied into the disagreement payoﬀs. But doing so would not alter our
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with the relatively higher degree of altruism obtains more than one-
half of the marital surplus, and hence, has a relatively larger payoﬀ.
Perhaps not surprisingly, this indicates that the diﬀerence between the
parents’ bargaining powers is proportional to the diﬀerence between
their respective degrees of altruism. Interestingly, the parents’ degrees
of altruism when they remain married (µf and µm)h a v en oi m p a c to n
their respective bargaining powers. These only play a role in deter-
mining the size of the marital surplus. However, the Nash-bargained
transfer (which underlies the utility payoﬀs) will depend on the relative







(µf − µm)W(If,I m) − [λf(i) − λm(i)]w(If,I m;i)

.
The following example illustrates the role of parents’ degrees of altruism
on the bargaining outcome. Suppose that i = f, λf(f) >λ m(f)a n d
µm >µ f = 0. That is, the father is to be allocated custody upon
divorce, and his degree of altruism in that regime exceeds that of his
wife, but the exact opposite is the case in the regime where they are
married. Under these assumptions, the father has more bargaining
power than the mother, and hence obtains more than one-half of the
marital surplus. This is so, even though he makes no contribution to
that surplus (µf = 0). In this case, TN < 0, that is, the mother makes
a transfer to the father in the Nash bargain. Now change the above
example by assuming that µf >µ m = 0. In this case, while the father
continues to obtain more than one-half of the surplus, it is possible
that he has to make a transfer to the mother. This is because (since
µm = 0) she receives no direct utility, and hence, in order to strike a
bargain, she will have to receive some transfer from her husband.
3.4. Equilibrium Underinvestments. Having characterized the out-
come of the negotiations at date 2 over the partition of the marital sur-
plus (for an arbitrary set of decisions made at dates 0 and 1), we now
proceed in the standard backward induction fashion and characterize
the equilibrium investment levels chosen by the parents at date 1. We
begin by characterizing the ﬁrst-best investment levels.
The ﬁrst-best (or Pareto-eﬃcient) investment levels Ie =( Ie
f,Ie
m)
maximize the diﬀerence between the marital surplus and the total cost
of the investments, (µf + µm)W(If,I m) − kfIf − kmIm. As such, Ie =AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF CHILD CUSTODY 15
(Ie
f,Ie
m) is the unique solution to the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
(µf + µm)Wf(If,I m)=kf (4)
(µf + µm)Wm(If,I m)=km. (5)
The left-hand sides of equations (4) and (5) are respectively the so-
cial (or aggregate) marginal beneﬁts of the father’s and the mother’s
investments, while the right-hand sides denote their respective private
(which are identical to the social) marginal costs.
The Nash equilibrium investment levels Ii
f and Ii
m chosen by the fa-
ther and the mother (given the assumption that i will have custody
upon divorce) are the unique solutions to the following ﬁrst-order con-
ditions:
(µf + µm)Wf(If,I m)
2
+
[λf(i) − λm(i)]wf(If,I m;i)
2
= kf (6)
(µf + µm)Wm(If,I m)
2
+
[λm(i) − λf(i)]wm(If,I m;i)
2
= km. (7)
The left-hand sides of equations (6) and (7) are respectively the private
marginal beneﬁts of the father’s and the mother’s investments, while
the right-hand sides denote their respective private marginal costs. Un-
der Assumptions 1 and 2, the social marginal beneﬁt from each par-
ent’s investment strictly exceeds her/his private marginal beneﬁt. It
then follows that the parents underinvest relative to their respective
ﬁrst-best investment levels:
Lemma 1. Regardless of which parent receives custody of the child, the
equilibrium investment levels chosen at date 1 are strictly less than the
(corresponding) ﬁrst-best levels.
This underinvestment result comes about because neither parent is
able to obtain — in the bargaining equilibrium — the full, social (or
aggregate) marginal beneﬁt from her/his respective investment. Each
parent is “held-up” ex post, after investments are sunk, by the other
parent. This hold-up problem arises in many other contexts (see Hart
[1995] and the references therein). It is precisely for this phenomenon
that the allocation of custodial rights has eﬃciency consequences.
4. The Optimal Sole Custody Rule
We now analyze the issue of what comprises the optimal custody
rule.23 By optimal we mean the rule that maximizes the net surplus,
23We extend this analysis in section 5 by allowing for the possibility of joint
custody as an alternative feasible option.16 MARCO FRANCESCONI AND ABHINAY MUTHOO
which for an arbitrary pair of investment levels (If,I m)i sg i v e nb y 24
(8) S(If,I m) ≡ (µf + µm)W(If,I m) − kfIf − kmIm.
The ﬁrst-best net surplus — i.e., the net surplus with the ﬁrst-best lev-
els of investments — is Se ≡ S(Ie
f,Ie
m), where the ﬁrst-best investment
levels are characterized in subsection 3.4. In the same subsection, we
also characterized the equilibrium investment pair (Ii
f,Ii
m) that yields
the equilibrium net surplus under i-custody, Si ≡ S(Ii
f,Ii
m), i = f,m.
From Lemma 1 (and the assumption that W is concave) it follows that
Se >S i (i = f,m). If Sf >S m it is optimal to allocate custody to the
father, and if Sf <S m it is optimal to allocate custody to the mother.
If Sf = Sm it does not matter as to which parent is allocated custody.
From (8) it is clear that the optimal custody rule will also provide rela-
tively higher equilibrium child utility and equilibrium marital surplus,
and relatively smaller distortions of the equilibrium investment levels
from their respective ﬁrst-best levels.25 In this sense, therefore, the
optimal custody rule is consistent with the best-interest-of-the-child
principle (Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit 1979).
4.1. The Case With A Sole Investor. For simplicity, we ﬁrst ana-
lyze the case in which only one of the two parents makes an investment
decision at date 1. Without loss of generality, we assume that the sole
investor is the father. This is equivalent to the assumption that the
mother’s constant marginal cost of investment, km, is suﬃciently large.
This situation is applicable, for example, when parental investments
involve signiﬁcant monetary expenditures, and the father is the main
(or the only) wage earner in the family. Clearly, even if the mother
makes no monetary investments, her presence and control over the fa-
ther’s investment might be as relevant to the child utility as the father’s
investment itself. Indeed, the comparative importance (productivities)
24In what follows, we say, for convenience, “i-custody” to indicate that child
custody is allocated to parent i (i = f,m).
25Notice that if each parent’s equilibrium investment level is higher under i-
custody than under j-custody (i  = j), then Si >S j, and hence i-custody is un-
ambiguously the optimal custody rule. In this case, therefore, the magnitudes of
the equilibrium net surplus in the two possible custody regimes do not have to be
computed and compared in order to determine which parent should be optimally
allocated custody. But if one parent’s equilibrium investment is relatively higher
under i-custody while the other parent’s equilibrium investment is relatively higher
under j-custody (i  = j), then in order to determine which parent should receive
custody we need to evaluate the relative magnitudes of the two equilibrium net
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of the two parents for the generation of the returns from the father’s
investment is a key force determining the optimal custody rule.
4.1.1. Characterization and Preliminary Results. Because the father is
the only investor, we focus solely on the father’s investment incen-
tives.26 It follows immediately after diﬀerentiating the expression in
















If the right-hand side of (9) is strictly positive, then it is optimal to al-
locate custody to the father. But if the right-hand side of (9) is strictly
negative, then it is optimal to allocate custody to the mother.27 The
sign of the right-hand side of (9) depends on: (i) the parents’ respec-
tive degrees of altruism towards their children upon divorce, and (ii) the
child’s marginal utilities of the father’s (the sole investor) investment
when the father is allocated custody and when the mother is allocated
custody.28
Optimal custody is independent of the parents’ respective degrees of
altruism when they are married, µf and µm. This conclusion would be
obvious if child custody were to be determined ex post after divorce,
because µf and µm would no longer be relevant. However, this result
is obtained in the context of a model in which custody is established
ex ante, in a prenuptial contract, when the values of both µf and µm
26From (8) maximizing the net surplus when only the father invests is equiva-
lent to minimizing the distortion of the father’s equilibrium investment from his
ﬁrst-best level. Given Lemma 1 and the assumption that W is concave, this
means maximizing his investment incentives (or equilibrium marginal returns to
his investment).
27If the right-hand side of (9) is zero, then it does not matter whether it is
the father or the mother who receives custody. In this case, custody could be
determined by some other rule that departs from the “winner-take-all” principle
illustrated in this section. Examples of such compromise solutions are discussed,
among others, by Elster (1989), and include random selection of the custodial parent
and joint custody. We shall return to the joint custody solution in section 5.
28If custody is awarded to the mother, the father will continue to invest in the
child not only because he is the only parent with an income (or the mother’s income
is too low), but also because courts (or other legal institutions) will guarantee the
implementation of the terms of divorce. In this context, we abstract away from
problems of enforcement (such as compliance with child support orders), which have
been addressed in other studies (e.g., Weiss and Willis 1993; Seltzer, McLanahan,
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are still potentially relevant. Indeed, here the optimal custody rule
provides the sole investor (father) with the best incentives to invest
while the parents live together. Even from that ex-ante standpoint,
therefore, the determination of child custody should only be inﬂuenced
by the parents’ degrees of altruism in the two divorce regimes.29
Another implication of (9) is that in order for custody to matter —
by which we mean that custody should optimally be allocated to one
parent rather than the other — it must not be the case that in each
divorce regime the parents’ degrees of altruism are identical. In fact,
if the mother and father had the same degree of altruism, then they
would have equal bargaining power regardless of whom is allocated cus-
tody to, and hence, the father’s marginal returns from his investment
(which determine his investment incentives) are the same whether he
gets custody or not. We summarize these results in the following:
Lemma 2. If joint custody is not a possibility, the optimal custody
rule is independent of the parents’ degrees of altruism when they are
married. Custody matters only if in at least one of the two divorce
regimes the parents’ degrees of altruism diﬀer from each other.
4.1.2. Parental Altruism is Independent of the Divorce Regime. We
now derive and discuss a set of results that concern the exact nature of
optimal custody. They apply to the case in which each parent’s degree
of altruism is the same across the two divorce regimes.
Proposition 1. Assume that for each i = f,m, λi(f)=λi(m)=λi.
(a) If the child’s marginal utility of the father’s investment is higher
under f-custody than under m-custody, then it is optimal to allocate
custody to the parent who has the relatively greater degree of altruism
in the two divorce regimes.
(b) If the child’s marginal utility of the father’s investment is higher
under m-custody than under f-custody, then it is optimal to allocate
custody to the parent who has the relatively smaller degree of altruism
in the two divorce regimes.
Figure 1 illustrates these results. It plots diﬀerences in parents’
valuations during divorce, λf − λm, against diﬀerences in the relevant
technological parameters, wf(.;f)−wf(.;m). The ﬁgure clearly shows
29It should be emphasized, however, that a diﬀerent conclusion will be reached
in section 5 when joint custody is explicitly modeled. In that world both µf and µm
aﬀect the optimal custody rule through the equilibrium value of the joint custody








Figure 1. An illustration of Proposition 1.
that, for a given technological structure, a slight variation in parental
preferences may deliver opposite custody allocations in equilibrium.
Similarly, for given parental valuations, small changes in technology
may imply diﬀerent custody rules. We shall return to this point later
in this section as well as in sections 5 and 6.
Contrary to what is implied by this proposition, casual observation
and introspection may suggest that in order to provide the sole investor
(father) with the best investment incentives, custody should be allo-
cated to him. Indeed, such intuition lies at the heart of the incomplete
contracting literature. But the assets considered in that literature are
private goods, while the asset in our model (i.e., the child) is a public
consumption good. In an environment in which agents deal with pri-
vate goods, the non-owning party gets no beneﬁt from the asset when
the party who owns the asset chooses not to cooperate. In contrast,
in the case of children, the noncustodial parent’s utility is likely to be
always aﬀected by the child’s welfare (as assumed, for instance, by Del
Boca and Flinn [1995]), although perhaps in a somewhat reduced way
because of the loss of proximity and control or less frequent contact
(Weiss and Willis 1985).
As in Besley and Ghatak (2001) and Rasul (2003), Proposition 1(a)
shows that custody should go to the parent who cares most about the
child (the shaded ﬁrst and fourth quadrants in Figure 1), even if the
other parent is the sole investor (fourth quadrant). This conclusion
is also consistent with the results of Weiss and Willis (1985). With20 MARCO FRANCESCONI AND ABHINAY MUTHOO
Proposition 1(b) we reach however a diﬀerent conclusion. The reason
is because other studies derive their result under the assumption that
the marginal utility of investment is higher for the sole investing party
when it has ownership of the asset, which is the underlying hypothesis
of Proposition 1(a). This assumption has some appeal in the context
of the ownership of physical private (or public) assets. But it may not
always be appropriate in the context of the allocation of child custody
rights after divorce. In fact, Proposition 1(b) identiﬁes the possibility
that the father’s (ﬁnancial) investment in the child is far more valuable
if it is the mother who implements or has control over the investment
itself (second quadrant of Figure 1). Put it diﬀerently, even if the father
is the sole investor and the mother’s valuation of the child after divorce
is lower than the father’s, it is optimal (in terms of generating utility
beneﬁts for the child) to assign custody to her if the father’s investment
is more productive “in her hands” rather than his.30
Proposition 1 emphasizes the importance of both the two parents’
valuations of the child in the divorce regimes and the technologies that
the parents use to produce child services as major determinants of
custody allocations. The model does not point to the organizational
conﬁgurations or institutions that are best positioned to provide the
father with an incentive to continue to invest in the child (e.g., child
support orders, presumptive guidelines, visitation rights). It does how-
ever identify the mechanism through which the optimal custody rule
operates. The central force at work when there is only one investor (the
father in our example) concerns his bargaining power relative to that
of the mother during their negotiations. This determines his marginal
returns on his investment, which, in turn, determine his investment
incentives. Hence, given any conﬁguration of parental degrees of altru-
ism and the father’s investment productivities across the two divorce
regimes, the optimal custody rule aims to maximize the father’s rela-
tive bargaining power. The consideration of bargaining powers between
30Interestingly, this line of reasoning gives, at least in part, a rational foundation
to the Solomonic judgement in a well-known custody dispute (Elster 1989). To two
women who both claimed custody of a child, King Solomon ruled to cut the disputed
child in two, so that each woman could enjoy half of it. The woman who was willing
to have the child cut in two revealed herself ineligible for custody, whereas the
woman who was willing to give the child up (and, therefore, arguably the one who
valued the child less) received the custody (1 Kings 3:16-28). Solomon reached this
conclusion on the basis of the two women’s behaviour during the custody dispute,
while in our model legal institutions do not play any role. Proposition 1(b) reaches
a similar conclusion but hinges, instead, on the parents’ diﬀerences in post-divorce
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partners will turn out to be of primary importance also when we allow
for the possibility of joint custody (see section 5).
4.1.3. Parental Altruism is Sensitive to the Divorce Regime. Proposi-
tion 1 examines the case in which each parent’s degree of altruism is the
same across both divorce regimes. We now analyze the consequences
of relaxing this assumption. It is plausible, in fact, that such a param-
eter is regime speciﬁc (i.e., for each parent, it may diﬀer depending on
whether it is the father or the mother who has custody): for example,
the father’s valuation of the child can be greater when he has custody.
The following proposition considers the case in which in each divorce
regime the custodial parent’s degree of altruism is no less than that
of the noncustodial parent, and in at least one of these regimes it is
strictly greater.
Proposition 2. If λf(f) ≥ λm(f) and λm(m) ≥ λf(m),w i t ha tl e a s t
one of these inequalities being strict, then it is optimal to allocate cus-
tody to the father.
In contrast to the result stated in Proposition 1, Proposition 2 im-
plies that the optimal custody rule is independent of the technological
parameters. That is, whether the father’s investment is more produc-
tive when he has custody or when the mother has custody does not
matter. The irrelevance of the parents’ productivities should be con-
trasted with the results in the incomplete-contract literature, where
such factors are the major determinant for an optimal allocation of
property rights over physical assets. The reason for this diﬀerence lies
once again in the diﬀering nature of the assets under consideration (i.e.,
children versus private goods and services).
When taken in conjunction with Proposition 1, the result of Propo-
sition 2 has a substantial implication. Suppose each parent’s degree
of altruism is virtually the same across both divorce regimes, with the
mother’s being slightly greater. That is, λf(f)=λf(m)=α and
λm(f)=λm(m)=α +  ,w h e r e  is positive and arbitrarily close to
0. Suppose also that the child’s marginal utility of the father’s invest-
ment is higher under f-custody than under m-custody. Proposition
1(a) is applicable, and implies that it is optimal to allocate custody
to the mother. Now suppose, instead, that the mother’s degree of
altruism varies slightly across the two divorce regimes. So, while it
is still the case that λm(m)=α +  , assume that λm(f)=α −  .
Proposition 1 is no longer applicable. But Proposition 2 is, and im-
plies that custody should be allocated to the father. Therefore, when
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rule rests on such valuations as well as on the parent who invest in the
child. As in Besley and Ghatak (2001), the allocation of custody in
this case depends solely on the comparative altruism of the two par-
ents. But, diﬀerently from previous models, Proposition 2 underlines
also the importance of which parent makes the investment, although
the (diﬀerential) eﬃciencies with which this investment is converted
into child welfare are inconsequential.31
Our next result considers the case in which one parent’s productivity
is more important than the other parent’s for generating the returns
on the father’s investment, namely:
Proposition 3. Assume that at least one parent’s degree of altruism
varies across the two divorce regimes.
(a) If the child’s marginal utility of the father’s investment under m-
custody is suﬃciently larger than under f-custody, then it is optimal
to allocate custody to the parent who has the relatively smaller degree
of altruism in the divorce regime when the mother has custody.
(b) If the child’s marginal utility of the father’s investment under f-
custody is suﬃciently larger than under m-custody, then it is optimal
to allocate custody to the parent who has the relatively greater degree of
altruism in the divorce regime when the father has custody.32
As with our previous results, the implications of this proposition can
be appreciated in terms of the impact on the father’s relative bargain-
ing power. Suppose that the mother’s productivity is greater than the
father’s in terms of generating the returns from his investment in the
child. By making the mother the custodian, one maximizes the aggre-
gate returns of any given level of investment. However, one ought to
account for the level of investment that the father will choose in the
ﬁrst place. We need to ensure that the father obtains most of such
returns. Proposition 3(a) shows that custody should be optimally al-
located to the mother as long as her degree of altruism in that divorce
regime is smaller than that of the father. This would provide the father
with a relatively greater bargaining power.
Proposition 3, therefore, conﬂates the insights of all the results illus-
trated so far. That is, the optimal custody rule is underpinned by the
31That a small change in parents’ degrees of altruism could lead to a substantial
change in custody allocations may be of some concern. This is driven by the fact
that joint custody is excluded. We shall return to this point in sections 5 and 6.
32It is worthwhile noticing that in Proposition 3(a) the parents’ degrees of al-
truism in the divorce regime when the father has custody (i.e., λf(f)a n dλm(f))
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comparative degrees of parental altruism, the diﬀerential investment
productivities with which parents produce child welfare, and which
parent invests in the child. This last ingredient is obviously relevant
here because we have been concerned with the case of only one in-
vestor. We now extend our analysis and examine the case in which
both parents can invest in their child at date 1.
4.2. Optimal Custody When Both Parents Invest. The analysis
in this subsection concerns the case when parental altruism is indepen-
dent of the divorce regime. This makes our analysis similar to that
presented in 4.1.2 above.
The following expression, which is analogous to expression (9), is
















If both the right-hand side of (9) and the right-hand side of (10) are
strictly positive, then it is optimal — in terms of providing both the
father and the mother with best investment incentives — to allocate
child custody to the father. If both the right-hand side of (9) and the
right-hand side of (10) are strictly negative, then it is optimal to give
the child to the mother. But if the signs of the right-hand sides of
(9) and (10) diﬀer — i.e., one is strictly positive and the other strictly
negative — then the optimal custody allocations can be determined
only by comparing the equilibrum net surpluses across the two divorce
regimes. These allocations will be derived in section 5.33 Here instead
we state the result that applies to the case when the degrees of parental
altruism do not depend on the divorce regime:
Proposition 4. Assume that for each i = f,m, λi(f)=λi(m)=λi.
(a) If the child’s marginal utility of a parent’s investment is higher
33Under, for example, the hypothesis on parental altruism of Proposition 2, the
optimal custody allocation cannot be determined when both parents make invest-
ment decisions by analyzing expressions (9) and (10). In general, optimal custody
will involve some compromise in the provision of investment incentives to the par-
ents, in the sense that the parents will end up with less than their respective best
investment incentives. To determine how this compromise looks like in equilibrium,
we ought to examine the equilibrium levels of the net surpluses under each of the
two possible sole custody regimes. This requires a slightly diﬀerent and more ar-
ticulated model than that developed so far. The analysis of that model is deferred
until section 5.24 MARCO FRANCESCONI AND ABHINAY MUTHOO
when custody is allocated to that parent, then it is optimal to allocate
custody to the parent who has the relatively greater degree of altruism
in the two divorce regimes.
(b) If the child’s marginal utility of a parent’s investment is higher when
custody is allocated to the other parent, then it is optimal to allocate
custody to the parent who has the relatively smaller degree of altruism
in the two divorce regimes.
This result generalizes the conclusions of Proposition 1 to the case
when both parents invest in the child under the hypothesis that each
parent’s degree of altruism is the same across divorce regimes. There-
fore, the parents’ valuations of the child after separation and the tech-
nology that they use (while married) to generate child welfare are both
equally important to determine the optimal custody allocation. In par-
ticular, in terms of preference parameters, there are conditions under
which custody should optimally be allocated to the parent who values
the child the most in the two divorce regimes, and other conditions
under which the exact opposite conclusion holds (i.e., in equilibrium
sole custody should be allocated to the parent who values the child the
least in the two divorce regimes).
5. An Extension to Joint Custody
In order to develop our main results so far, we excluded the possi-
bility of joint custody from our analysis; our attention was restricted
to the two sole custody allocations (in which one or the other parent
is allocated custody). In this section we extend our model and explore
the circumstances under which joint custody gives rise to a higher equi-
librium marital surplus (and child welfare) than either of the two sole
custodial allocations. This requires a slightly diﬀerent model.
5.1. The Extended Model: Notation and Assumptions. As be-
fore, decisions are taken sequentially at three dates. At date 0 the
parents agree and commit to the child custody allocation that would
be implemented if they divorce at date 2. Investments are undertaken
(and sunk) at date 1, and negotiations over the marital surplus (in
the shadow of divorce) occur at date 2. The new aspect of this ex-
tended model is that, at date 0, the set of feasible custodial allocations
now include joint custodial allocations besides the two sole custodial
allocations.
We denote by π (π ∈ [0,1]) the fraction of time spent by the child
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is the fraction of time spent in the mother’s custody. By deﬁnition,
the father’s share is increasing in π, while mother’s share is decreasing
in π. This formulation allows for a continuum of possible custodial
allocations ranging from the mother having sole custody (π =0 )t o
the father having sole custody (π = 1), with intermediate values of π
deﬁning the set of all possible joint custodial allocations. The optimal
value of π (determined at date 0) is one which maximizes the equilib-
rium value of the net marital surplus and hence the equilibrium child
welfare. We make three relatively mild assumptions which, while re-
stricting to some extent the class of situations under study, will allow
us to reach a few additional salient results about the optimal custody
rule when joint custody is a feasible option. All three assumptions
have been introduced for algebraic convenience and, perhaps with the
exception of Assumption 4, could be easily relaxed without altering
the gist of our arguments. The ﬁrst assumption is that the constant
marginal costs of investments to the father and the mother (kf and km)
are identical, that is:
Assumption 3. kf = km = k.
Our second assumption is that the child’s (ﬂow) utility payoﬀ during
the state in which the parents are divorced and the child is with parent
i (i = f,m) is some fraction of the child’s (ﬂow) utility payoﬀ when the
parents are married.34 While limiting, this assumption simpliﬁes the
analysis of and discussion on the determination of the optimal value of
π. Formally, we assume:
Assumption 4. For each i = f,m and for any If ≥ 0 and Im ≥ 0,
w(If,I m;i)=γiW(If,I m),w h e r e0 <γ i < 1.
The child utility function W could then be interpreted as a mapping
that deﬁnes the transformation of parental investments into child qual-
ity and child utility when the parents remain married. Similarly, the
parameter γi — which captures the properties of the technology that
parents use in their investments — could be viewed as a measure of
the importance of parent j (j  = i) in the transformation of parental
investments into child utility when the parents are divorced and the
child is with parent i. Clearly parent j’s importance is decreasing in
γi. Our third assumption is the hypothesis underlying Proposition 2,
namely, that in each sole custody regime the custodial parent’s degree
34In a framework in which custody can be shared by parents, it is instructive
to interpret the players’ payoﬀs as being “ﬂow” payoﬀs (or payoﬀs per unit time).
Thus, given an arbitrary value of π ∈ [0,1], the child’s (aggregate) payoﬀ if the
parents divorce is πw(If,I m;f)+( 1− π)w(If,I m;m).26 MARCO FRANCESCONI AND ABHINAY MUTHOO
of altruism is no less than that of the non-custodial parent, and in at
least one of these regimes it is strictly greater. That is:
Assumption 5. ∆f ≡ λf(f)−λm(f) ≥ 0 and ∆m ≡ λm(m)−λf(m) ≥
0, with at least one of these inequalities being strict.
5.2. Equilibrium Bargaining Outcome and Investments. Given
an arbitrary value of π (determined at date 0) and an arbitrary pair
of investment levels chosen at date 1), f and m bargain at date 2 over
the marital surplus in the shadow of divorce. The (aggregate) payoﬀs
to the father and the mother respectively from divorce are as follows
(making use in particular of Assumption 4):
df ≡






πλm(f)γf +( 1− π)λm(m)γm

W(If,I m). (12)
Assumptions 2 and 4 imply that there exist gains from staying mar-
ried. Hence, applying the NBS in which the threat points are given by
(11) and (12), we ﬁnd that the Nash-bargained utility payoﬀs to the
father and the mother are respectively
(13) V
N
f =Ω fW(If,I m)a n dV
N













(µf + µm) − πγf∆f +( 1− π)γm∆m

. (15)
As expected, the sum of the Nash-bargained utility payoﬀs equals the
value of the gross marital surplus (µf + µm)W(If,I m). Notice that
i’s (i = f,m) payoﬀ is a fraction, Ωi/(µf + µm), of that gross marital
surplus. Thus, Ωi deﬁnes i’s bargaining power. By Assumption 5,
the father’s bargaining power Ωf is increasing in π, while the mother’s
bargaining power Ωm is decreasing in π.
We now characterize the equilibrium investment levels chosen at date
1. Given an arbitrary value of π, the equilibrium investment levels,
denoted by I∗
f and I∗
m, comprise the unique solution to the following
ﬁrst-order conditions:
(16) ΩfWf(If,I m)=k and ΩmWm(If,I m)=k.AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF CHILD CUSTODY 27
It is straightforward to verify that the conclusion of Lemma 1 is robust
to the inclusion of joint custody: for any π ∈ [0,1], the equilibrium
investment levels will be strictly less than the corresponding ﬁrst-best
levels. However, diﬀerent custodial allocations (i.e., diﬀerent values
of π) will induce diﬀerent equilibrium investment levels, and hence
diﬀerent equilibrium marital surplus and equilibrium child utility.



































where Σ = WffWmm − (Wfm)2 — with all the ﬁrst-order and second-
order partial derivatives evaluated at the equilibrium investment levels
I∗
f and I∗
m. If the investments are weak substitutes (Wfm ≤ 0), then I∗
f
is strictly increasing in π and I∗
m is strictly decreasing in π.B u ti ft h e
investments are complements (Wfm > 0), then the eﬀects of a marginal
change in π on equilibrium investments are in general ambiguous. This
is because a marginal change in π has two eﬀects: a direct eﬀect and
an indirect (or strategic) eﬀect. The direct eﬀect, which is captured
by the second terms in the square brackets in (17) and (18), entails
that I∗
f increases in π and I∗
m decreases in π: a marginal increase in
π increases Ωf and decreases Ωm leading f to increase his investment
level and m to decrease her investment level. There is however also
an indirect, strategic eﬀect that is captured by the ﬁrst terms in the
square brackets in (17) and (18): if investments are substitutes then
the indirect eﬀects are in the same direction as the direct eﬀects, but
if they are complements then the indirect eﬀects are in the opposite
direction.
5.3. Optimal Custody Allocations. Moving backwards to date 0,
we derive the value of π which maximizes the equilibrium net surplus
S(I∗
f,I∗
m), where S(.,.) is deﬁned in (8). The equilibrium net surplus
depends on the value of π indirectly, via its inﬂuence on the equilibrium
investment levels. We write it as S∗(π). So, the optimal custody
allocation, denoted by π∗,i st h ev a l u eo fπ which maximizes S∗(π)
over all π ∈ [0,1]. If π∗ =1t h e nf-custody is optimal, and if π∗ =0
then m-custody is optimal. If instead 0 <π ∗ < 1t h e nj o i n tc u s t o d y
is optimal, with π∗ and 1 − π∗ being the shares in that joint custody
allocated to the father and the mother respectively.28 MARCO FRANCESCONI AND ABHINAY MUTHOO
The following result is useful in developing our subsequent analysis
of optimal custody allocations:




 0 ⇐⇒ Wff(Ωf)
4 − Wmm(Ωm)
4  0,
where Wff and Wmm are evaluated at the equilibrium investment levels.
Without imposing any further restrictions on the child utility func-
tion W, it is evident from Lemma 3 that not much can be said about
π∗. In what follows, therefore, we derive a number of results about
π∗ in the context of some additional parametric restrictions on W.W e
begin with the case in which the third partial derivatives of W are zero,
which means that Wff and Wmm are identical and equal some strictly
negative constant, but we do not impose any restriction on the sign of
Wfm.
Proposition 5. If the third partial derivatives of W equal zero, then
the optimal custody allocation is a joint custodial allocation, with the
shares in that joint custody to the father and the mother being π∗ and






While the hypothesis of this proposition restricts the class of appli-
cable functions W (e.g., quadratic), its implications are powerful, as
they reappear in the context of a larger class of utility functions (see
below) and oﬀer a signiﬁcant benchmark. The optimal value π∗ from
Proposition 5 is the unique value of π such that Ωf =Ω m, i.e., it is
the unique custody allocation that ensures that parents have equal bar-
gaining powers. As in the case when only sole custody is possible (see
Propositions 1 and 4), this balancing out of bargaining powers is rele-
vant, especially in relation to the provision of investment incentives to
the two parties. Of course, the parents’ equilibrium investments may
diﬀer as they also depend on the structure of the function W.
Turning to the optimal custody allocation itself, we note that it is in-
creasing in γm/γf. This implies that the less important the father is in
the transformation of parental investments into child utility when the
parents are divorced and the child is with the mother, the larger should
be his share in the optimal joint custody allocation. Although unap-
pealing at ﬁrst, this relationship is consistent with the idea that a key
force underlying the determination of the optimal custody allocationAN ECONOMIC MODEL OF CHILD CUSTODY 29
concerns the tendency to equalize parental bargaining powers. This,
in turn, would help induce an optimal compromise in the provision of
investment incentives to the two parents.35 Hence, an increase in γm,
which increases the mother’s bargaining power, is (partially) oﬀset by
an increase in π.
The dependence of π∗ on the parental degrees of altruism also merits
some discussion. If ∆f =0( ∆ m =0 )t h e nπ∗ =1( π∗ =0 ) .T h u s ,i f
the degrees of parental altruism are identical when parents are divorced
and the child is with parent i, it is optimal to allocate sole custody to
parent i —e v e ni fp a r e n tj (j  = i) values the child signiﬁcantly more
when custody is solely allocated to parent j. Once again, this must be
viewed within the logic of allocating child custody rights optimally so
as to equalize or balance out parental bargaining powers. Therefore,
the general result from Proposition 5 is that, regardless of productivity
or technology considerations (as captured by W, γf and γm), the parent
who values the child relatively more receives a relatively lower share in
the optimal joint custodial allocation. Technology parameters however
matter by determining the exact value of π∗.
We now examine another widely used class of functions of the Cobb-
Douglas type, namely, W = A(If)η(Im)ξ. These functions are strictly
increasing in each of their two arguments, and are strictly concave.
Furthermore, since Wfm > 0, the investments are complements. Our
main results are summarized in the following:
Proposition 6. Suppose that W = A(If)η(Im)ξ,w h e r eA>0, 0 <
η<1, 0 <ξ<1 and η + ξ<1. Deﬁne
¯ ∆f ≡
(1 − θ)(µf + µm)
(1 + θ)γf
and ¯ ∆m ≡
(θ − 1)(µf + µm)







(a) If ξ<ηand ∆f ≤ ¯ ∆f, then the optimal custody allocation is π∗ =1
(sole custody to the father).
(b) If ξ>ηand ∆m ≤ ¯ ∆m, then the optimal custody allocation is
π∗ =0(sole custody to the mother).
(c) Otherwise — i.e., if either ξ = η,o rξ<ηand ∆f > ¯ ∆f,o r
35On this point, the increasing labor supply of mothers, which can be seen as an
indication of mothers’ greater bargaining power (Blau 1998; Basu 2001), has been
accompanied by the demise of maternal presumption in custody disputes and by
increasingly important legal changes promoting fathers’ custodial rights (Maccoby
and Mnookin 1997).30 MARCO FRANCESCONI AND ABHINAY MUTHOO
ξ>ηand ∆m > ¯ ∆m — then the optimal custody allocation is a joint
custodial allocation, with the shares in that joint custody to the father






(1 − θ)(µf + µm)
(1 + θ)(γm∆m + γf∆f)
.
An immediate result of Proposition 6 is that the optimal custody
rule is not independent of the parents’ degrees of altruism when they
are married, µf and µm. This is in stark contrast to the results of
Lemma 2 and to those reported in Rasul (2003). Such parameters
determine the critical bounds ¯ ∆f and ¯ ∆m as well as the equilibrium
share of joint custody, π∗.I fξ<η(hence θ<1), then π∗ increases as
µf +µm increases. So if the father’s investment is more important than
the mother’s investment, his share of joint custody increases ceteris
paribus with the size of the marital surplus generated when the couple
is married. The opposite is true if ξ>η . Thus, parents’ altruism and
their investments during marriage do aﬀect the optimal custody rule
by aﬀecting the size of the marital surplus. Diﬀerently from the case
in section 4, the possibility of joint custody gives each parent certain
bargaining endowments in the shadow of the law, which are related to
the parents’ degrees of altruism while married.
Consider now the case in which η = ξ, that is, the function W is
symmetric in parental investments. Proposition 6(c) implies that the
optimal custody allocation is identical to the allocation identiﬁed in
Proposition 5 (indeed, if η = ξ,t h e nθ = 1 and the second term in π∗
disappears). The earlier discussion on Proposition 5 therefore applies
to this case as well, even though the third partial derivatives of W here
are not zero.36
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the main insights of Proposition 6 when
ξ<ηand ξ>η , respectively. We focus our discussion on Figure 2
(opposite points hold for the symmetric case of Figure 3). Since ξ<η ,
θ must be less than one, while Assumption 2 implies that ∆f <µ f
(by that assumption, λf(f) is bounded above by µf, while λm(f)i s
by deﬁnition bounded below by 0). Figure 2 plots ¯ ∆f as a function
of θ, which divides the (θ,∆f) space into two regions. It is easily
checked that ¯ ∆f is strictly decreasing and strictly convex in θ,a n d
that ¯ ∆f(0) = (µf +µm)/γf and ¯ ∆f(1) = 0. Because ¯ ∆f(0) >µ f,t h e r e
exists a critical, strictly positive value of θ (namely, ˜ θ =[ ( 1− γf)µf +
36Note that the eﬃciency parameter A has no impact on the optimal custodial
allocation. This is because it has an identical impact on the parents’ investment
















Figure 2. An illustration of Proposition 6 for the case
when ξ<η .
µm]/[(1 + γf)µf + µm]) such that for any θ<˜ θ, custody is always
allocated to the father. So if the father’s investment is substantially
more important than the mother’s investment, then it is optimal to
give the father sole custody regardless of parents’ preferences. This
result generalizes Proposition 2, which applies when θ = 0 (that is,
when the father is the sole investor). As θ increases beyond ˜ θ (thus,
the importance of the father’s investment progressively decreases until
it equals that of the mother’s at θ = 1), there are two possible regimes
of custody allocations, which do depend on parents’ valuations. If
∆f ≤ ¯ ∆f, i.e., the father’s degree of altruism is not too greater than the
mother’s when he has sole custody, then it is again optimal to allocate
sole custody to the father (Proposition 6(a)).37 But once ∆f exceeeds
¯ ∆f, the relatively greater bargaining power of the father must be oﬀset
by allocating some positive share of custody to the mother (and in
this case, both ∆f and ∆m are relevant to the determination of π∗).
Joint custody (the non-shaded areas in Figures 2 and 3 below µf and
37Interestingly, this allocation is independent of the diﬀerence in parents’ valu-
















Figure 3. An illustration of Proposition 6 for the case
when ξ>η .
µm respectively) arises in equilibrium precisely because it maintains
a balance in the provision of investment incentives between the two
parents (Proposition 6(c)).
As θ approaches 1 (from below), the parents’ valuations contained
in ∆f are such that the region of f-custody gradually vanishes. At
θ = 1, sole custody cannot arise in equilibrium. At that point in fact
we return to the case in which η = ξ,w i t ht h eo p t i m a ls h a r eo fj o i n t
custody coinciding with that described by Proposition 5. As θ increases
beyond 1 (ξ>η ), Figure 3 shows how the symmetric case operates. At
ﬁrst there is a mixture of joint custody and m-custody. In this region,
the exact optimal rule depends on the values of ∆m being greater or
smaller than ¯ ∆m. But for all values of θ greater than the critical value
ˆ θ =[ ( 1+γm)µm+µf]/[(1−γm)µm+µf], the optimal rule is m-custody.
The exact paths of the optimal custody rule crucially depend on the
degree to which the father’s investment is more or less important than
the mother’s (i.e., it depends on how large ξ is relative to η), while
in general the equilibrium value of π∗ depends both on ∆f and ∆m,
as well as on both µf and µm. Figure 4 shows, for given values of
∆f and ∆m, the relationship between π∗ and θ. It visually displays
what we have just discussed. For values of θ between 0 and ˜ θ, π∗ =1 ,AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF CHILD CUSTODY 33
that is, the optimal rule is f-custody. If θ>˜ θ, f-custody is still
optimal, but only up to the point in which θ = θf,w h e r eθf is such
that ¯ ∆f(θf)=∆ f.B e y o n d θf, joint custody is optimal, with the
father’s share monotonically declining in θ.A tθ =1 ,W is symmetric
in parental investments and joint custody is allocated according to
the rule of Proposition 5. The share of father’s custody continues to
decline as θ further increases, until it reaches θm, where the optimal rule
assigns sole custody to the mother, i.e., π∗ = 0. Figure 4 also illustrates
the cases of a reduction in the relative degrees of parental altruism
under f-custody (∆ 
f < ∆f) and under m-custody (∆ 
m < ∆m). For
a given technology (that is, for a given value of θ), a reduction, say,
in ∆f is associated with an increase of the region of f-custody and an
increase in π∗. Such changes are consistent with the notion of giving
a greater custody responsibility (in the form of either greater chances
of sole custody or greater shares of joint custody) to the parent with
a relatively more important investment. This is exactly because this
parent’s valuation declines relative to the other parent’s: the greater
custody responsibility is meant to provide the higher-productivity party
with suﬃcient incentives to invest in the child despite his/her relatively
lower valuation. As both ∆f and ∆m continue to decline, the curve
connecting θf (at π∗ = 1 in Figure 4) to θm (at π∗ = 0) shifts towards
the vertical line at θ = 1 (although it will never reach this line because
of Assumption 5). In the limit, as both ∆f and ∆m become arbitrarily
small, the optimal custody rule is f-custody if θ<1, m-custody if
θ>1, and joint custody for θ = 1 (where π∗(1) depends on the ratio
∆f/∆m). In this limiting case, therefore, Proposition 6 generalizes the
results of Proposition 1.
In sum, the main message of Proposition 6 is that when one parent’s
investment is signiﬁcantly more important than the other parent’s or
when diﬀerences in the degrees of parental altruism are suﬃciently
small, technological factors dominate the equilibrium allocation of cus-
todial rights. In these cases, sole custody should optimally be allocated
to the parent whose investment is relatively more important. However,
when the importance of the parents’ investments are suﬃciently simi-
lar and diﬀerences in the degrees of parental altruism are large, joint
custody allocations are optimal as long as both parents contribute to
the production of child quality. Joint allocations are optimal also when
the importance of the father’s investment is equivalent to that of the
mother’s, regardless of the preference structure. For a given technol-
ogy with which parents produce child quality (and welfare), the op-
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(∆f,∆m)
Figure 4. An illustration of Proposition 6 for three arbi-
trary and feasible pairs: (∆f,∆m), (∆ 
f,∆m)a n d( ∆ f,∆ 
m),
where ∆ 
i < ∆i (i = f,m). Notice that for each i = f,m, θi
is the unique value of θ such that ¯ ∆i(θ)=∆ i and θ 
i is the
unique value of θ such that ¯ ∆i(θ)=∆  
i.
comparative degrees of altruism in such a way that their respective
bargaining powers are weighed against each other (and thus their joint
investment incentives are maximized). In these circumstances, their
degrees of altruism while married matter too for the determination of
the equilibrium share of joint custody.
We ﬁnally consider a simple parametric case in which investments
are neither complements nor substitutes (Wfm = 0). The results for
this case, which are virtually identical to those discussed in Proposition
5, are formalized in the following:




τmIm,w h e r eτf > 0 and
τm > 0. Then the optimal custody allocation is a joint custodial alloca-
tion, with the shares in that joint custody to the father and the mother
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The analysis in this section does not oﬀer a general characterization
of the optimal custody allocation when both parents invest in the child
and joint custody is possible. Additional research on this issue remains
to be done. However, in spite of the speciﬁc parametrizations of W,
three insights of Propositions 5-7 are worth emphasizing. First, as in
the world in which joint custody is excluded (section 4), both prefer-
ence parameters and technological factors matter in determining the
optimal custody rule. This ties in the ﬁndings of both strands of the
incomplete contracting literature, that with private goods (Grossman
and Hart 1986) as well as that with physical public goods (Besley and
Ghatak 2001). Second, joint custody is not always optimal, which may
help explain why sole custody is still the predominant arrangement
among divorcing couples in many countries. Third, in equilibrium,
child custody is allocated (jointly or otherwise) so as to balance out
the bargaining powers of both parents and their investment incentives.
Under the right technological conditions, this can be achieved by trad-
ing oﬀ greater child valuations with smaller shares of custody. This
strategy is likely to be more appealing than that implied by Proposi-
tions 1-4, where in the absence of joint custody small perturbations in
parental preferences are suﬃcient to lead to opposite custody alloca-
t i o n s( s e eF i g u r e1 ) .
6. Discussion
6.1. The Optimal Custody Rule in the Context of Child Cus-
tody Law. Almost everywhere, legal design and judicial interpretation
of child custody norms have historically changed according to social,
cultural and religious values and beliefs about the basic institutions
of the family and of marriage (Elster 1989).38 In particular, in most
Western countries, there has been a shift from rules (e.g., paternal pref-
erence or maternal preference) to a discretionary principle based on the
best interest of the child.
The absolute paternal preference rule, which dominated British leg-
islation up to the end of the nineteenth century (and possibly well into
the twentieth century), was based on the father’s unconditional rights
in all family issues (as an example, see the quote from Maidment [1984]
at the outset of the paper). This implied that the court could not ad-
judicate a custody dispute in favor of the mother, even if an abusive
father might lose his legal rights to child custody. In nineteenth-century
38Social and historical analyses of child custody law are, among others, in Maid-
ment (1984) on English common law, Maccoby and Mnookin (1997) on the Amer-
ican development, and Pearl and Menski (1998) on Muslim family law.36 MARCO FRANCESCONI AND ABHINAY MUTHOO
America, instead, the paternal preference rule did not take hold, with
courts generally awarding custody to either parent on the basis of a
fault-based presumption — according to which children are best taken
care of by the ‘innocent’ party, who, in the majority of cases, turned
out to be the mother (Mnookin 1975). Besides other considerations,
this principle was primarily motivated by a compensatory and retribu-
tive reasoning. In the twentieth century, a maternal preference rule
gradually emerged as the dominant standard in most countries (see,
for instance, the quote from Ellsworth and Levy [1969]). This rule was
based on the presumption that children, and particularly children of
tender ages, were “entitled to have such care, love, and discipline as
only a good and devoted mother can usually give” (Ullman vs Ullman
[1912], cited in Mnookin [1975, p. 235]). But by the beginning of the
1970s, most countries had replaced all such rules with the principle that
custody ought to be decided according to what is in the best interest
of the child.39
Custody allocations under the three early rules mentioned above (pa-
ternal, fault-based, and maternal presumption) are simple and precise
in that they require a single factual determination to be implemented
(e.g., whether one of the claimants is the biological father of the child,
or a showing of fault on the part of a spouse).40 The best-interest
principle, instead, has been severly attacked by legal scholars essen-
tially because it is indeterminate. That is, it gives substantial dis-
cretion to judges to make their own implicit predictions and impose
their own value judgements about which parent might better serve
the child’s interests (Maidment 1984; Maccoby and Mnookin 1997).
Because all custody rules create bargaining endowments for the par-
ents (what Mnookin and Kornhauser called “bargaining chips” [1979,
p. 968]), an important consequence of the indeterminacy of the best-
interest principle is that parents are likely to engage in strategic be-
havior that aﬀects not only resource allocations after divorce but also
39An analysis of the legislative reasons for the emergence of this principle is
beyond the scope of this paper. On this issue, see Mnookin (1975), Maidment
(1984), Elster (1989), Buehler and Gerard (1995).
40Elster (1989) discusses the possibility of justifying such rules on the grounds of
the best interest of the child. They could also be interpreted within our optimal rule.
For example, the conditions underlying either Proposition 1(a) or Proposition 6(a)
(i.e., the father’s investment is decisively more important than the mother’s and his
degree of altruism is not less than the mother’s) would be suﬃcient to give rise to a
paternal presumption. Conversely, times in which the mother’s valuation is greater
than the father’s and his investment is more important than hers (Proposition
1(a)) or times in which the mother’s investment is perceived as being essential
(Proposition 6(b)) would be characterized by a maternal presumption.AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF CHILD CUSTODY 37
pre-divorce intrahousehold decisions (including the investments on the
child). This therefore may have detrimental eﬀects on child welfare
if parents strategically underinvest or it may be ineﬃcient if parents
strategically overinvest.
The optimal custody rule that we have developed in sections 4 and
5 is embedded in an economic (optimizing) model of household be-
haviour.41 As such, our rule is consistent with the best-interest princi-
ple, in that it maximizes child welfare by providing the best incentives
to both parents to invest in their child even after divorce. But, while
retaining this principle, our rule: (i) is underpinned by a well-deﬁned
set of behavioral parameters that govern family decisions (namely, par-
ents’ preferences and technologies), and (ii) relies on parents’ private
ordering and prenuptial agreements. To the extent that both (i) and
(ii) can be gauged, veriﬁed and enforced, the optimal custody rule pro-
vides us with precise guidelines as to how custody allocations should
be achieved. In this sense, the optimal rule is determined, or at least
it is not confronted by the same high degree of indeterminacy that
an otherwise unqualiﬁed rule based on the best-interest principle must
face. In the next two subsections, we elaborate on some of the issues
that lie behind points (i) and (ii).
6.2. Theory Ahead of Measurement Again? A ss h o w ni ns e c t i o n s
4 and 5, the optimal custody rule depends crucially on two sets of pa-
rameters, i.e., parents’ degrees of altruism towards the child both before
and after divorce (in diﬀerent custody regimes) and productivities of
the parents’ investments in the child after divorce. Before having any
judiciary function, these parameters needs to be measured. Admit-
tedly, it is hard to assess them for each mother and father (and not
only for those who are going through a divorce), particularly because
they refer to a state (divorce) and a custody regime (m-custody vs
f-custody) that are, in most cases, hypothetical. Formal econometric
analyses of family behavior may help identify such parameters, but at
present only a limited number of studies provide us with the informa-
tion we need.
41The interpretation of the best-interest principle has been usually driven by
hypotheses that, in the words of Elster (1989) “have sometimes acquired the status
of ‘legislative facts’ ” (p. 133). One of such facts rests on the psychoanalytic view
that continuity of the parent-child relationship is crucial (Goldstein, Freud, and
Solnit 1979). In practice, this amounts to award custody to the parent with whom
the child is living (or has been living for some time) at the time of the dispute or
to the parent who has the role of the primary caretaker or caregiver.38 MARCO FRANCESCONI AND ABHINAY MUTHOO
In the case of the parental preference parameters, we refer to the work
of Del Boca and Flinn (1995), Flinn (2000), and Del Boca and Ribero
(2001). They all use data on separated and divorced individuals with
one child, whose physical custody has been assigned to the mother (m-
custody).42 So, at best, they inform us only on λf(m)a n dλm(m). In all
these studies, parental preferences over private consumption and child
consumption (or, as in Del Boca-Ribero, time spent with the child) are
assumed to be represented by Cobb-Douglas utility functions, with each
parent’s parameter being contained in the open unit interval. Del Boca
and Flinn (1995) can only recover the private consumption weight of
the father (λf(m)) but not that of the mother. Flinn (2000) estimates
both λf(m)a n dλm(m). His results reveal that the mean weight on
child consumption is between 0.225 and 0.250 for fathers and between
0.077 and 0.249 for mothers (see his Table 3, p. 566), suggesting that
divorced mothers tend to be less altruistic than divorced fathers (i.e.,
∆m ≡ λm(m)−λf(m) < 0).43 Finally, Del Boca and Ribero (2001) ﬁnd
that, on average, mothers value the time spent with their child much
more highly than fathers (i.e., ∆m > 0): their estimates are 0.689
and 0.253 for custodial mothers and noncustodial fathers respecively
(see their Table 2, p. 133). In sum, our knowledge about parental
preferences is limited. More research is clearly needed to establish how
robust the existing estimates are, and, especially, to recover the relative
concern for child welfare on the part of all parents (including those who
are married).
Our knowledge is perhaps even more limited in the case of the tech-
nology parameters. Three points are in order. First, there are no
estimates of the productivities of individual parental investments in
children. Neoclassical growth models have been augmented with home
production (see, among others, Parente et al. [2000]). But such models
are uninformative about the parameters of interest here, because they
do not identify child investments separately from either home or market
investments and do not distinguish the father’s investment from that
of the mother (these are in fact representative-agent models). Second,
42If the evaluation of child welfare by a divorced parent is a function of the
amount of time spent with the child, then all noncustodial parents will weight
child’s welfare less heavily than they would if they had custody of the child (see our
Proposition 2, and Flinn and Del Boca [1995]). Therefore, the estimates reported
in such studies can be seen as lower bounds of weights given by all parents on child
utility.
43However, Flinn (2000) argues that, with his data, the identiﬁcation of the
mother’s preference parameter distribution is weak, and its estimates should then
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we have some understanding of the relationships that link a number of
parents’ behaviors and characteristics (such as education, market work,
family structure, and income) to various child outcomes, e.g., birth
weight, schooling, economic activity, and teenage childbearing (see the
comprehensive surveys by McLanahan and Sandefur [1994], Haveman
and Wolfe [1995], Duncan and Brooks-Gunn [1997], and Mayer [1997]).
Although these relationships are potentially relevant for the identiﬁca-
tion of our key technology parameters, they are not enough as they
typically do not single out the contributions of fathers from those of
mothers. In the studies that do (such as Lazear and Michael [1988]
and Thomas [1990]), it is hard to separate parental investments from
parental endowments, which include preferences.44 Third, we also have
some idea about the time that parents allocate to their children, and
how that has changed over time. For example, Sandberg and Hoﬀerth
(2001) ﬁnd that the time American children aged 3-12 spent with their
parents (both fathers and mothers) did not decrease between 1981 and
1997, and in two-parent families it increased substantially.45 Yet these
ﬁndings say very little about how productive parental investments ac-
tually are and whether the parents’ productivities diﬀer depending on
whether it is the father or the mother or both parents who invest.
Again, more empirical research on this issue is needed.
6.3. Is There a Case for Prenuptial Contracts on Child Cus-
tody? Our study has revolved around the notion that husbands and
wives are empowered to create their own legally binding commitments
in the shadow of the law as a form of private ordering (Mnookin and
Kornhauser 1979).46 This notion stresses the importance of prenuptial
44In a related empirical paper, we show that a few parental activities (for in-
stance, childcare and caring for ill children) are important determinants of actual
custody allocations for a sample of divorced British families in the 1990s. Although
father’s custody is observed in only 13 percent of cases, fathers who have the main
responsibility for childcare see their odds of getting custody increased by about 70
percent, and for those who are mainly responsible for the care of ill children, the
odds more than double (Francesconi and Muthoo 2003).
45Gershuny (2000) reports similar results for about 20 other countries since the
early 1960s up until the early 1990s.
46In our model parents are able to contract only on custody allocations. Ar-
guably these are easily veriﬁable by third parties (or courts). Parents however
cannot legally bind themselves on child investment levels. Typically, such invest-
ments are complex requiring several hard-to-measure parental inputs, and thus
they cannot be easily veriﬁed by third parties. Parent-child relationships are nat-
urally characterized by unforseeable and indescribable contingencies (Tirole 1999):
this aspect provides an additional reason as to why parents cannot make binding
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agreements on a number of aspects of the marital relationship, includ-
ing child custody in case of divorce. Unfortunately, one diﬃculty with
prenuptial contracts is that they are hard to enforce. This could be at
least partially addressed by improving the clarity of the statutes and
norms governing premarital law and custody adjudications.
Legal scholars and professionals however point to other, more funda-
mental complications posed by prenuptial contracts, which ought to be
weighed against the advantages that we have illustrated so far (Nash-
eri 1998). We brieﬂy discuss three of such problems. First, marriage
is arguably a more intimate and complex relationship than a business
partnership and, as noted by the Supreme Court of the United States,
has “more to do with the morals and civilization of a people than any
other institution” (Maynard vs Hill [1888, p. 205]). Although marriage
in the United States and elsewhere does not operate today as it did in
1888 at the time of the Maynard decision, this is the reason why many
countries are opposed to the idea of treating marriage as just another
business contract and place it under the direct control of state courts
and legislatures.47 Second, small perturbations in the deep parame-
ters that underlie the optimal custody rule described in section 4 may
often result in dramatically diﬀerent custody allocations. This prob-
lem, which is less severe in the world described in section 5, may be
magniﬁed by the fact that some of those parameters are not fully ob-
served at the time of the custody decision (because they refer to future
and potential custody regimes), and so parents may have a dangerous
incentive for strategic behavior (Elster 1989).
Third, prenuptial contracts may be embroiled with unequal bargain-
ing powers held by future spouses. This has been seen as a manifest
form of abuse (Brod 1994), which can be most eﬀectively prevented
by having instead a uniform legislation that applies to marriage and
divorce and provides all family members with greater economic and
legal predictability. Perhaps more importantly, this inequality could
also fail to reﬂect possible changes in the balance of power between
partners during the course of their marriage and after its dissolution
(Basu 2001). Such concerns seem to be even more cogent in the case of
child custody, which, at present, has not yet been considered a matter
that prenuptial contracts can cover.
47The fact that marital relationships are very personal matters may actually lead
to the opposite conclusion, whereby it is natural to allow marriage to be treated as
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7. Conclusions
The terms of divorce, in general, and the allocation of child custo-
dial rights, in particular, do matter. They have not only distributive
but also eﬃciency consequences within intact families, by inﬂuencing
each parent’s incentives to make relationship-speciﬁc investments, in-
cluding investments in their children. An optimal allocation of child
custody rights cannot disregard such considerations. In this paper
we have formally explored the issue of child custody from this per-
spective. We show that the optimal custody rule is systematically
related to the comparative degrees of parental altruism, the compara-
tive parental productivities in generating the returns to the child from
parents’ investments, and to which parents actually invests in the child.
In particular, four results deserve special mention. First, the optimal
allocation of custodial rights depends on both preferences and tech-
nological factors, regardless of whether joint custody is ruled out or
not. This reconciles the ﬁndings of the incomplete contracting litera-
ture with private goods (Grossman and Hart 1986) and those of the
same literature with physical public goods (Besley and Ghatak 2001).
Second, and in contrast to Besley and Ghatak (2001) and Rasul (2003),
custodial rights can be allocated either to the parent who values the
beneﬁts from child quality more or, viceversa, to the parent with the
lowest valuation. Custody can go to the low-valuation parent if this
endows the parent with a greater bargaining power and this, in turn,
induces him/her to provide optimal levels of child investment. Third, if
one parent’s investment is signiﬁcantly more important than the other
parent’s investment, then sole custody is preferred to joint custody and
it should be allocated to the parent whose investment is relatively more
important. In these circumstances, parents’ preferences are irrelevant.
Fourth, joint custody is optimal when the importance of the parents’
investments are suﬃciently similar and the diﬀerences in their valu-
ations of child quality are suﬃciently large. In these cases, a greater
share of joint custody should go to the parent with the lowest valuation
precisely because the parent with the highest valuation would invest
in the child anyway, and the low-valuation parent would be endowed
with greater bargaining power.
We have only scratched the surface of the several and complex mat-
ters that impinge on the allocation of child custody rights. More the-
oretical and empirical work needs to be done to improve our under-
standing of the optimal custody rule. One possible direction of the
theoretical analysis is the formulation of a dynamic game in which
parents (and children) interact repeatedly over time, learn about their42 MARCO FRANCESCONI AND ABHINAY MUTHOO
investments and quality, and build up some trust. In that environment,
marriage could move closer to ﬁrst-best equilibria even in the presence
of transaction costs. Likewise, endogenous divorce could arise natu-
rally not only after a particularly bad marriage innovation but also as
a result of a persistent deterioration of parental investments. In gen-
eral, on the grounds that transaction costs aﬀect spouses’ decisions,
an incomplete-contracts approach could be used to study many other
family issues that are likely to be inﬂuenced by such costs, including
family formation, fertility, household labor supply, retirement, and in-
tergenerational links. Even few of these other extensions make up a
rather full agenda for future research.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
After substituting the hypothesis of this proposition — namely, that for
each i = f,m, λi(f)=λi(m), which, in what follows, we denote simply by













(λf − λm)[wf(.;f) − wf(.;m)].
The proposition follows almost immediately from an examination of this
expression. Part (a) follows by noting that if, by the additional hypothesis
of part (a), wf(.;f) >w f(.;m), then the sign of the left-hand side of (A.1)
is the same as the sign of the diﬀerence λf −λm; which, in turn, means that
the father’s investment incentives are relatively higher under f-custody [m-
custody] if λf >λ m [if λf <λ m]. Part (b) follows by noting that if, by
the additional hypothesis of part (b), wf(.;f) <w f(.;m), then the sign of
the left-hand side of (A.1) is the same as the sign of the diﬀerence λm −λf;
which, in turn, means that the father’s investment incentives are relatively
higher under f-custody [m-custody] if λf <λ m [if λf >λ m].
Proof of Proposition 2
Given the hypothesis of this proposition, we can deﬁne λf(f)=λm(f)+α
and λm(m)=λf(m)+β,w h e r eα ≥ 0, β ≥ 0a n dα + β>0. After














The proposition follows immediately by noting that since the right-hand
side of (A.2) is strictly positive, this implies that the father’s investment
incentives are relatively higher under f-custody.AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF CHILD CUSTODY 43
Proof of Proposition 3
If wf(.;m) is suﬃciently larger than wf(.;f), then the sign of the left-hand
side of (9) is the same as the sign of the diﬀerence λm(m) − λf(m). This
means that f-custody [m-custody] is optimal if λf(m) < [>]λm(m). This
establishes part (a). If, on the other hand, wf(.;f) is suﬃciently larger than
wf(.;m), then the sign of the left-hand side of (9) is the same as the sign
of the diﬀerence λf(f) − λm(f). This means that f-custody [m-custody] is
optimal if λm(f) < [>]λf(f), which establishes part (b).
Proof of Proposition 4
After substituting the hypothesis of this proposition — namely, that for
each i = f,m, λi(f)=λi(m), which, in what follows, we denote simply by

























(λm − λf)[wm(.;f) − wm(.;m)]. (A.4)
The proposition follows almost immediately from an examination of these
expressions. Part (a) follows by noting that if, by the additional hypothesis
of part (a), wf(.;f) >w f(.;m)a n dwm(.;m) >w m(.;f), then both the sign
of the left-hand side of (A.3) and the sign of the left-hand side of (A.4) is
the same as the sign of the diﬀerence λf − λm; which, in turn, means that
both the father’s and the mother’s investment incentives are relatively higher
under f-custody [m-custody] if λf >λ m [if λf <λ m]. Part (b) follows by
noting that if, by the additional hypothesis of part (b), wf(.;f) <w f(.;m)
and wm(.;m) <w m(.;f), then the signs of the left-hand sides of (A.3) and
(A.4) are the same as the sign of the diﬀerence λm − λf; which, in turn,
means that both the father’s and the mother’s investment incentives are
relatively higher under f-custody [m-custody] if λf <λ m [if λf >λ m].
Proof of Lemma 3
Diﬀerentiating S∗ w.r.t. π, we obtain that:
∂S∗
∂π

































After substituting for the derivatives of the equilibrium investments (using
(17) and (18)) into the right-hand side of (A.5), simplifying, re-arranging44 MARCO FRANCESCONI AND ABHINAY MUTHOO














and ﬁnally using the ﬁrst-order conditions in (16) to substitute for Wf and










The lemma follows immediately since Σ > 0, Ωf > 0, Ωm > 0, and given
Assumptions 4 and 5.
Proof of Proposition 5
Under the (additional) hypothesis of this proposition, it follows from
Lemma 3 that for any π ∈ [0,1],
∂S∗(π)
∂π
 0 ⇐⇒ Ωm − Ωf  0.
Thus, using (14) and (15), we obtain that
∂S∗(π)
∂π
 0 ⇐⇒ (1 − π)γm∆m − πγf∆f  0.
Hence, it follows that S∗ has a unique stationary (or turning) point, namely
at π = π∗ (which is stated in the proposition), and that
∂S∗(0)
∂π




Hence, we have established that the unique stationary point π = π∗ is the
point at which S∗ achieves its maximum value over the interval [0,1].
Proof of Proposition 6
From the ﬁrst-order conditions in (16) one obtains the following relation-









It follows from an application of Lemma 3 — after substituting for the
equilibrium values of Wmm and Wff, using the above relationship between
the equilibrium investment levels, some simplication, and ﬁnally substituting
for Ωf and Ωm —t h a t
∂S∗(π)
∂π
 0 ⇐⇒ φ(π)  0, whereAN ECONOMIC MODEL OF CHILD CUSTODY 45










(1 − π)γm∆m − πγf∆f

.
We then note that
φ(π)  0 ⇐⇒ π∗  π, where
π∗ is as stated in Proposition 6(c). This implies that π∗ is the unique station-
ary (or turning) point of the function S∗. Proposition 6 follows immediately
from the above results and the following two results:
π∗  0 ⇐⇒ ∆m  ¯ ∆m and π∗  1 ⇐⇒ ¯ ∆f  ∆f.
Proof of Proposition 7
From the ﬁrst-order conditions in (16) one obtains the following relation-






It follows from an application of Lemma 3 — after substituting for the
equilibrium values of Wmm and Wff, using the above relationship between
the equilibrium investment levels, some simplication, and ﬁnally substituting
for Ωf and Ωm —t h a t
∂S∗(π)
∂π
 0 ⇐⇒ (1 − π)γm∆m − πγf∆f  0.
Hence, it follows that S∗ has a unique stationary (or turning) point, namely
at π = π∗ (which is stated in the proposition), and that
∂S∗(0)
∂π




Hence, we have established that the unique stationary point π = π∗ is the
point at which S∗ achieves its maximum value over the interval [0,1].
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